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Feelings of knowing (FoK) are introspective self-report ratings of the felt likelihood that
one will be able to recognize a currently unrecallable memory target. Previous studies
have shown that FoKs are influenced by retrieved fragment knowledge related to the
target, which is compatible with the accessibility hypothesis that FoK is partly based
on currently activated partial knowledge about the memory target. However, previous
results have been inconsistent as to whether or not FoKs are influenced by the accuracy
of such information. In our study (N = 26), we used a recall-judge-recognize procedure
where stimuli were general knowledge questions. The measure of partial knowledge was
wider than those applied previously, and FoK was measured before rather than after
partial knowledge. The accuracy of reported partial knowledge was positively related to
subsequent recognition accuracy, and FoK only predicted recognition on trials where
there was correct partial knowledge. Importantly, FoK was positively related to the
amount of correct partial knowledge, but did not show a similar incremental relation
with incorrect knowledge.
Keywords: metacognition, feeling-of-knowing, recall, accessibility hypothesis, partial knowledge, working
memory
INTRODUCTION
In everyday cognition, metamemory judgments may occur when we fail to retrieve information
from memory, but where the accompanying subjective feeling indicates potential access: it feels
that with more time, or under different circumstances, one might have been able to retrieve
the searched-for information after all. A common example of this form of experience is the
feelings of knowing (FoK, Brown, 1991; Koriat, 1993, 1995, 2007). Feelings of this type can be
studied using the recall-judge-recognize (RJR) procedure (Hart, 1965). For items that are not
successfully retrieved during an initial recall phase, participants rate the felt likelihood of being able
to recognize the correct item among a set of alternatives. FoKs are then compared with subsequent
recognition performance. This procedure can be used with factual questions relating to existing
general knowledge, or with knowledge that is newly acquired in the laboratory. Across a variety of
studies using different experimental procedures, FoKs have proven a good predictor of recognition
memory performance (Metcalfe, 2000), although there is disagreement over their exact nature. In
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line with the focus of this research topic, this paper aims to get
a better insight into to what extent FoKs reflect the amount of
relevant information currently activated in working memory.
It has been variously suggested that FoK (a) reflects a direct
monitoring of memory traces (the trace access view; see Hart,
1965), (b) involves fast monitoring of the familiarity of the
stimuli used to prompt memory retrieval, e.g., familiarity of
knowledge domains referred to by words in a general knowledge
question (the cue familiarity hypothesis; see Reder and Ritter,
1992; Metcalfe et al., 1993), or (c) reflects products of the ongoing
retrieval process such as the quantity and salience of partial or
fragmentary target information retrieved during memory search
(the accessibility hypothesis; see Koriat, 1993, 1995). Some broader
models acknowledge separate influences of different mechanisms.
According to one such model (Koriat and Levy-Sadot, 2001) FoKs
are initially shaped by cue familiarity but are subsequently also
influenced by the relative accessibility of partial knowledge that
comes to mind during the retrieval attempt. Another integrative
hypothesis (Liu et al., 2007) is that positive FoK judgments
(“knowing that you know”) are based on partial recovery of non-
recalled targets, and negative FoK judgments (“knowing that you
do not know”) on cue familiarity.
One way of studying the accessibility hypothesis is to ask
participants within a traditional RJR experiment to report any
fragmentary knowledge of the target even when they are unable
to correctly retrieve the target itself, which has been referred
to as overt accessibility of partial knowledge (Koriat, 1995). The
classic series of studies to explore this is a series of experiments
by Koriat (1993, 1995). Stimuli were either general knowledge
questions, nonsense letter strings, or nonsense word pairs. In
all experiments, FoK was positively related to the total amount
of partial knowledge reported, regardless of its accuracy. This is
consistent with the proposal that FoK is causally based on the
cumulative amount of partial knowledge that people feel they
have accessed. However, more recent studies have shown that
FoKs may be more strongly influenced by correct than incorrect
partial information (Dunlosky et al., 2005; Thomas et al., 2011,
2012). However, both Dunlosky et al. (2005) and Thomas
et al. (2011, 2012) studied newly acquired rather than pre-
existing knowledge. More specifically, stimuli included recently
acquired factual knowledge (Dunlosky et al., 2005), as well as
pairs of words, pictures, or meaningless figures (Thomas et al.,
2011, 2012). Neither of the studies looked at the relationship
between fragment knowledge and FoK for pre-existing semantic
knowledge. The generalizability of these findings to memory
situations involving general knowledge questions, is therefore
unclear.
Moreover, in studies involving general knowledge questions
(Koriat, 1993, 1995), measures of partial knowledge were quite
narrowly constrained in that people were specifically asked
to report structural fragments of the target (e.g., any letters
recalled). This might underestimate the contribution to FoK from
other types of partial knowledge. In fact, Koriat (1995, p. 312)
acknowledged the possible influences of “semantic attributes,
episodic information pertaining to the target, and activations
emanating from other sources.” Accurate measurement of these
other types of partial knowledge would be especially important
when stimuli were general knowledge questions measuring pre-
existing knowledge, rather than newly acquired knowledge of
meaningless stimuli (e.g., non-word letter strings). Furthermore,
a narrowly constrained measure of partial recall has a second
disadvantage. When the partial recall measurement involves
selecting items from a predefined set of alternatives, as in Koriat’s
(1993, 1995) studies, it is easier for participants to spuriously
generate guessed partial knowledge than with an open response
format. It should also be noted that in Koriat’s (1993, 1995)
studies, as well as in all but one of the studies reported by Thomas
et al. (2011, 2012), FoK ratings were given after partial knowledge
had been reported on any given trial. With this procedure, one
cannot rule out the possibility that FoK ratings were based on
a simple count of the amount of reported partial knowledge,
regardless of whether this knowledge was correct or incorrect,
and regardless of whether or not the incorrect partial knowledge
was genuinely felt to be correct or was prompted by the ease of
generating spurious examples.
In the current study, we address whether FoKs reflect partial
knowledge in a situation where FoKs and memory were measured
for general knowledge questions, and where FoK was measured
before the retrieval attempt. Our RJR procedure differed from
Koriat’s (1993, 1995) procedure in two important ways. First,
our procedure for measuring partial knowledge was more open-
ended in that the only constraint given to participants was a limit
on the maximum number of items they could report. A positive
relationship between FoK and partial knowledge would support
the hypothesis that FoK reflects overt accessibility. Conversely,
the lack of such relationship would suggest that FoK might be
more affected by other types of cues. Because our procedure was
designed to reflect a broader array of partial knowledge on which
naturally occurring FoKs are likely to be based, we also predicted
that recognition accuracy would now be positively related to the
accuracy of partial knowledge, as in the studies by Dunlosky et al.
(2005) and Thomas et al. (2011, 2012). To reduce the likelihood
that FoK ratings were just based on explicit evaluations of the
amount of partial knowledge that was deliberately retrieved and
reported, and therefore improve the ecological validity of the FoK
paradigm, our experiment also measured FoK immediately after
recall failure but before reports of partial knowledge. In addition,
following Schwartz et al. (2015) we measured FoK on all trials,
not just following retrieval failure.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-six student volunteers (16 women and 10 men) aged 19–
27 years (M= 20.8) were rewarded to take part for approximately
1.5 h with a lottery for gift tokens. The research was conducted
in accordance with the stipulations in the declaration of
Helsinki, and conformed to the regulations of the Norwegian
Data Protection Official for Research. Since participation was
anonymous and the data was therefore not covered by the
Norwegian Personal Data Act, the study was exempt from the
requirement to formally apply to the Data Protection Official
for Research. Since the study was not related to health, it was
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also not covered by the Norwegian Health Research Act and
was exempt from the requirement to formally apply to the
Regional Committee for Medical and Health Research Ethics.
Participants signed a written informed consent form in advance
of participation, in accordance with the official guidelines from
the Declaration of Helsinki.
Design
On each trial of a recall phase we consecutively tested (a) free
recall of the answer to a general knowledge question, (b) self-
rated FoK that the correct answer could be recognized later in
a multiple-choice test, (c) report of any partial knowledge, and
(d) a second chance to report the answer in case conservative
response biases inhibited overt recall during the first free recall
opportunity. On each trial of a subsequent recognition phase, the
correct answer to a previous question had to be selected from
among distracters.
The main independent variable (within-subjects) was the
quantity and accuracy of reported partial knowledge, and the
main dependent variables were FoK ratings, FoK accuracy, and
recognition accuracy.
Apparatus and Stimulus Material
Participants were tested in groups. Stimulus materials were
Norwegian. Pre-recorded instructions were played over speakers.
General knowledge questions for the initial recall task were
presented both via speakers and visually on a lecture hall screen
using E-prime (Schneider et al., 2002a,b). Participants responded
in a booklet where each question had a separate area for recall,
FoK, partial knowledge and second recall responses. For the
recognition phase, multiple-choice questions were presented in
a separate booklet where participants selected responses.
Procedure
Each of 64 recall trials started with a general information question
(e.g., “What is the name of the film that obtained seven Academy
Award nominations in 1999?”) with 10 s for written responding.
If no answer was given, participants were to draw a line through
the response box to prevent completing the answer later. An
auditory prompt then invited a FoK rating on a 10-point scale
[from weak (1) to strong (10)], and within 8 s, to indicate the
perceived likelihood of recognizing the correct answer if this was
presented among several alternatives. Partial knowledge was then
reported. Instructions were to write down any related knowledge
within 20 s, but not more than six units of knowledge (indicated
by six numbered lines in the response booklet). One example
question (“What is the name of the American who won Tour
de France 6 times?”) and three suggested partial knowledge
responses [“(comes from) Texas,” “(cycled for) US Postal,” “(had)
cancer”) were given beforehand. Participants were then again
given the opportunity to recall the correct answer within a time
limit of 5 s (henceforth late recall). The start and stop of each
segment of the recall trial were indicated over the speakers and a
tone marked the presentation of a new trial. Order of questions
was the same for all participants.
During multiple-choice recognition, questions occurred in
the same order as during the recall task. Four alternatives per
question were presented in the same order for each participant,
and each alternative (labeled A–D) was correct equally often. The
time limit for 64 multiple-choice trials was 10 min.
RESULTS
One potentially ambiguous question was removed from the
data, leaving 63 questions in total. One participant who
had misunderstood instructions was removed, leaving 25
participants.
Recall and Recognition Memory
Mean initial recall accuracy was 16.1% (SD = 0.1) rising
marginally to 18.7% (SD = 0.1) at late recall. Trials with correct
recall during either recall attempt were removed from subsequent
analyses.
Mean recognition for unrecalled answers was 33.7% correct
(SD= 0.1), which is significantly above the chance guessing level
of 25% [t(24)= 5.90, p (two-tailed)< 0.0001, r = 0.77].
Accuracy of Partial Knowledge
Partial knowledge was scored by two independent raters. Because
participants could report up to six items of information per
question, maximum score per trial was 6 (1 point per correct
item).
Items were scored as correct if they contained fragments of the
correct target (e.g., correctly reporting its first letter) or if they
referred to other varieties of partial knowledge. For example, for
the question “Which actor plays the main character in the TV
series Frasier?”, the correct labeling of an attribute of this actor
(e.g., “balding”), or comments such as “also plays in the TV series
Cheers,” would both gain 1 point.
The mean number of partial knowledge items reported per
question was 1.3 (SD = 0.6). The two raters agreed on the total
score for correct partial knowledge items on 73.5% of trials. For
remaining trials, they discussed discrepant items and agreed on
a score. Mean number of correct partial knowledge items was 0.5
per question (SD= 0.2).
Note that the number of correct or incorrect items reported
on any given trial had a different distribution than in the
one study by Koriat (1993, Experiment 1) to previously report
this information. In our experiment, only a minority of trials
(21%) were associated with 2 or more items of correct partial
knowledge, as was the case for incorrect partial knowledge (20%).
By comparison, 72% of trials in Koriat’s experiment contained
two or more correct partial knowledge items, and only 9%
contained more than two items of incorrect partial knowledge.
In our study, no partial knowledge at all was reported on 35% of
all trials (see Table 1).
Partial Knowledge and FoK
Figure 1 illustrates mean FoK rating for each level of partial
knowledge, with separate plots for correct versus incorrect partial
knowledge. Note that the two curves are calculated from the same
trials, since for a given FoK score, any combination of correct
and/or incorrect partial knowledge may have been reported.
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TABLE 1 | Total number of trials (pooled across participants) on which
reported partial knowledge contained various possible combinations of
incorrect and correct knowledge.
Number of incorrect items Number of correct items
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 449 122 48 19 10 0 0
1 213 114 37 11 0 1 0
2 117 38 13 4 0 0 0
3 49 15 0 1 0 0 0
4 12 2 1 0 0 0 0
5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FoK appears to increase as either correct or incorrect partial
knowledge rise from zero to one, but there is an indication that
the increment in FoK with further increase in partial knowledge
might be different for correct versus incorrect knowledge.
For each participant Pearson’s r was calculated for the
correlation between FoK rating (1–10) on each trial and the
number of correct partial knowledge items (0–6) reported on
that trial. A separate correlation was similarly calculated for
incorrect partial knowledge. For correct partial knowledge the
mean correlation of 0.22 (SD = 0.14) was significantly higher
than 0 [t(24) = 7.50, p (two-tailed) < 0.0001, r = 0.84], as was
the mean correlation of 0.14 (SD= 0.14) for incorrect knowledge
[t(24)= 5.03, p (two-tailed)< 0.001, r = 0.72].
Because Figure 1 indicates a comparable increase in FoK
from zero to one item of partial knowledge, but that increases
beyond one such item might have different influences on
the development of FoK for correct versus incorrect items,
modified correlation analyses were then conducted. For correct
partial knowledge, trials without any correct partial knowledge
were excluded. Similarly, the correlation for incorrect partial
knowledge was conducted after excluding trials without any
FIGURE 1 | The relation between FoK rating and number of reported
partial knowledge items, plotted separately for correct and incorrect
partial knowledge. Data for more than three items is not plotted due to
insufficient number of observations.
incorrect knowledge. For correct partial knowledge, the mean
positive correlation with FoK (M = 0.18, SD = 0.26) remained
significant [t(23) = 3.53, p (two-tailed) < 0.01, r = 0.59].
However, for incorrect knowledge, the mean correlation
(M = 0.01, SD = 0.24) no longer differed from 0 [t(22) = 0.20,
p (two-tailed)= 0.84, r = 0.04].
In other words, the initial correlation between the amount
of incorrect partial knowledge and FoK appears to be due
to the influence of reporting one item rather than none. In
contrast to correct partial knowledge, reporting more than one
item of incorrect partial knowledge does not increase FoK
any further. Shapiro–Wilk tests showed this null result for
incorrect knowledge cannot be attributed to violated normality
assumptions for parametric. Since there were more trials with
incorrect than correct items, right across the range of number of
reported items (see Table 1), the null result for incorrect items is
also unlikely to be a Type II error.
Partial Knowledge and Recognition
The correctness of partial knowledge showed a robust effect on
recognition accuracy. The number of correct partial knowledge
items was significantly greater on correct (M = 0.61, SD = 0.28)
than incorrect (M = 0.45, SD = 0.19) recognition trials
[t(24) = 3.59, p (two-tailed) < 0.01, r = 0.59]. Conversely
the number of incorrect partial knowledge items was greater
on incorrect (M = 0.55, SD = 0.32) than correct (M = 0.41,
SD= 0.35) recognition trials [t(24)= 2.39, p (two-tailed)< 0.05,
r = 0.44].
FoK and Recognition
The relationship between FoK and recognition accuracy was
expressed for each participant as the signal detection theory
(SDT) statistic Az to minimize the influence of response biases to
give high or low FoK ratings. Az is calculated from recognition
performance (correct versus incorrect) across the range of
different FoK ratings, and corresponds to the area under the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (Macmillan and
Creelman, 1991; Norman and Price, 2015). An Az score of
1 indicates a perfect positive relationship between FoK and
recognition performance, and a score of 0.5 indicates random
responding. The mean Az score was 0.55 (SD = 0.09), which is
significantly above the 0.5 chance level [t(24) = 2.62, p (two-
tailed) = 0.02, r = 0.47]. Overall, FoK was therefore predictive
of recognition accuracy.
However, further analysis showed that FoK only predicted
recognition performance with above-chance accuracy on trials
where there was some correct partial knowledge. For each
participant, two additional Az scores were calculated between
FoK and recognition performance. One included only incorrect
recall trials on which some correct partial knowledge was
reported (mean number of trials = 17.4, SD = 6.1), and one
included only those trials where no correct partial knowledge
was reported (mean number of trials = 33.7, SD = 7.9). For
trials lacking any correct partial knowledge, Az (M = 0.51,
SD = 0.12) was not different from chance [t(24) = 0.23, p
(two-tailed) = 0.82], which indicates non-predictive FoK. In
contrast, for trials where correct partial knowledge was reported
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(M = 0.59, SD = 0.12), FoK was a significant predictor of
recognition [t(21) = 3.53, p (two-tailed) < 0.01, r = 0.61]. Az
scores for these two types of trial also differed from each other on
a related t-test [t(21)= 2.66, p (two-tailed)< 0.05, r = 0.50)].
DISCUSSION
Using naturalistic general knowledge questions as stimuli, this
study replicates an established finding that when people cannot
recall a memory item, FoK ratings moderately predict subsequent
recognition accuracy. The novelty of our study was to make
two modifications to the procedure typically used in this type
of experiment to test the relation of FoK ratings to partial
knowledge: on each trial, we measured FoK before partial
knowledge was reported, and free reports of partial knowledge
were less constrained than in most previous studies.
The Relation between FoK and Partial
Knowledge
Our own study broadly replicated an apparent influence of partial
knowledge on FoK in a study that used general knowledge
questions as stimuli. Importantly, we also showed that this holds
even though partial knowledge was measured after FoK. This
demonstrates that any influence of partial knowledge on FoK
is not restricted to situations where people could simply base
their FoK rating on the amount of partial knowledge that they
have just reported, as in previous studies which asked for the
information to be reported first (Koriat, 1993, 1995). It is also
therefore more supportive of Koriat’s (2000, 2007) suggestion
that FoKs are intuitive, experience-based metacognitive judgments
(see also Norman, 2002; Price, 2002; Price and Norman, 2008;
Norman et al., 2010) as opposed to deliberative evaluations of the
amount and retrieval speed of partial knowledge.
We found that FoK increased monotonically with the amount
of both correct and incorrect partial knowledge. Both correct
and incorrect partial knowledge were positively related to the
strength of FoK as long as analyses included, respectively, trials
without any correct or incorrect partial information. When these
subsets of trials were removed, correct partial knowledge was still
a significant predictor of FoK, but incorrect partial knowledge
was not. Therefore it seems that FoK increases with increasing
amounts of correct partial knowledge, and that the presence—
but not the amount—of incorrect partial knowledge also boosts
FoK. This is inconsistent with the findings of Koriat (1993,
1995), and more in line with later studies that looked at the
relationship between fragment knowledge, FoK and memory for
newly acquired knowledge (Dunlosky et al., 2005; Thomas et al.,
2011, 2012).
One interpretation is that as the reported amount of incorrect
partial knowledge increases, it is more likely to reflect pure
guesses. However, this is unlikely to be the case since incorrect
partial knowledge negatively influenced recognition. If incorrect
items were thought to be correct, they would act as misleading
cues and actively impair selection of the right answer, but if
incorrect items were known to be guesses they should have a more
neutral impact on subsequent recognition.
The asymmetry we found between the influence of correct
and incorrect partial knowledge is at odds with existing
formulations of the accessibility hypothesis, and with Koriat’s
original findings. However, we suggest that it is actually more
consistent with Koriat’s central claim that FoK is an experience-
based metacognitive judgment that is influenced by activated
partial knowledge. When partial knowledge is activated via
spreading activation in semantic networks, there will be variation
in the representational distance between this knowledge and the
target domain activated by the general knowledge question. On
average, partial knowledge that is closest to the target domain will
be most highly activated, and is also most likely to be correct—
i.e., rated as closely relevant by the experimenters. Items of partial
knowledge that are incorrect will therefore on average contribute
less activation to whatever pooled global signal underlies the FoK.
And increases in the number of incorrect items will have less
influence than correct knowledge on the strength of the FoK.
By contrast, the fact that incorrect and correct partial knowledge
were previously found to be equally influential on FoK ratings
supports our suspicion that, in other studies, these ratings were
heavily based on what Koriat (2000, 2007) has referred to as
more deliberative information-based metacognitive judgments of
reported partial knowledge.
Why would activation of incorrect knowledge nevertheless
appear to make at least some contribution to FoK in a manner
that is independent of the amount of knowledge reported?
Possibly this reflects the contribution that general familiarity
with the topic of the question has on FoK (the cue familiarity
hypothesis, Reder and Ritter, 1992; Metcalfe et al., 1993). This
contribution is well established and is integrated into broader
theoretical models of FoK (e.g., Koriat and Levy-Sadot, 2001;
Liu et al., 2007). Cue familiarity could contribute to FoK even
when only incorrect partial knowledge was activated, accounting
for the apparent influence of one or more incorrect items of
knowledge. However, greater degrees of cue familiarity need not
necessarily be associated with increments in the reported amount
of incorrect partial knowledge.
The Relation between Recognition and
Partial Knowledge
The accuracy of partial knowledge was significantly related to
subsequent recognition performance, and FoK only predicted
recognition with above-chance accuracy on trials where some
correct partial knowledge had been reported. Although this
has not consistently been demonstrated in the past (Koriat,
1993, 1995), it is in line with theories that stress the role of
partial knowledge in FoK, and also with empirical findings
from experimental situations in which semantically meaningful
information was accessible (Thomas et al., 2011, 2012). The
reason why we found such a relationship may also have to do with
our measurement procedure. In our study, partial knowledge
was broadly measured using open-ended reports of all target-
related knowledge. This argues that general semantic ingredients
contribute to FoK and subsequent recognition. In contrast, in the
study where Koriat (1995, Experiment 3) used general knowledge
questions as stimuli, he measured very specific types of partial
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knowledge such as single letters and number of syllables. The
demand to generate such specific fixed category responses might
increase the discrepancy between the partial knowledge reported
and the partial knowledge responsible for genuinely predictive
FoK judgments and successful recognition performance. Our
results can therefore be regarded as compatible with those of
Thomas et al. (2011, 2012).
Another effect of the rather narrow response categories
in Koriat’s original studies is that they are more likely to
encourage guessing, since they decrease the likelihood that
genuine partial knowledge can be reported, and provide an
easy set of available response alternatives to generate guesses.
In Koriat’s (1995, Experiment 3) study using general knowledge
questions, guessing was even explicitly encouraged. If a large
proportion of incorrect partial knowledge items derive from
guesses, then incorrect items in general can be considered
largely as random noise. As pointed out earlier, the difference in
recognition performance that follows reports of incorrect partial
knowledge items versus predictive correct items will therefore
be less than when incorrect items are genuinely misleading
cues that actively depress recognition performance. Additionally,
the predictive accuracy of correct partial knowledge may be
reduced since the intentional generation of guessed responses
could interfere with retrieval of correct partial knowledge during
the recall phase of an experiment.
Note that these problems were minimized in the one
experiment where Koriat (1993, Experiment 1) found the
predicted relationship between recognition accuracy and
correct/incorrect partial knowledge. First, that experiment used
meaningless letter strings where the range of potential partial
knowledge is smaller than for general knowledge questions and
is therefore more likely to be captured by narrow response
categories. Second, the experiment discouraged guessing by
respectively rewarding or punishing reports of correct or
incorrect partial knowledge.
Our procedure was designed to reduce the likelihood that
FoK ratings reflected explicit evaluations of the amount of partial
knowledge that was deliberately retrieved and reported. Still, one
cannot completely rule out the possibility that the instruction to
report partial knowledge on a trial-by-trial basis may, at a general
level, influence people’s tendency to retrieve partial information,
even before being explicitly instructed to do so. One possible
consequence of such evaluation could be an increase in the
frequency of undetected high-confidence errors. However, we
find it unlikely that a 10-s recall phase would have been sufficient
to both attempt retrieving the target information as well as
explicitly retrieving and evaluating partial knowledge. Moreover,
the aim of measuring FoKs before rather than after partial
knowledge was also not to eliminate any potential influence of
explicitly generated partial knowledge, but instead to rule out
the possibility that the influence of partial knowledge on FoK
is limited to situations in which people have been specifically
instructed to report certain forms of partial knowledge before
rating FoK.
CONCLUSION
According to Koriat’s (1993, 1995) accessibility hypothesis, FoK
increases with the amount of partial knowledge that can be
reported during the initial recall attempt, regardless of the
accuracy of this knowledge. Even though the influence of partial
knowledge on FoK is also confirmed by later studies using word
or picture stimuli (Dunlosky et al., 2005; Thomas et al., 2011,
2012), existing studies disagree as to whether the influence of
partial knowledge on FoK depends on its accuracy. By applying
a procedure that avoided some methodological limitations of
Koriat’s original studies, we found support for the hypothesis
that FoK is partly based on the kind of intuitive assessment
of target-related partial knowledge that has been referred to as
experience-based metacognitive judgment (Koriat, 2007). Both
of our procedural modifications appeared to be relevant: i.e., the
use of a very open-ended measure of partial knowledge, and
measuring FoK before partial knowledge. Together they reduce
the possibility that FoK ratings were based on a deliberative
summing up and evaluation of partial knowledge from artificially
constrained categories that might encourage participants to
generate spurious partial knowledge reports.
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